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Abstract: We apply the discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts to NLSY79 
data to study race/gender wage inequality with a focus on distinguishing unobserved productivity 
differences from discrimination in the labor market and also simulating the pattern of wage 
dynamics. Our findings suggest that the productivity differential between black and white 
workers is 3% of white worker productivity while productivity differences between men and 
women are estimated to be 3% of male productivity. 91 % of firms are prejudiced towards black 
workers and 93% towards female workers. The distaste they hold towards black workers is about 
70% of white worker productivity and towards women, 95% of male productivity. Compared to 
estimates in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2010), we derive similar results on 
productivity differences, but much higher estimates on discrimination. In addition, our model 
predicts similar patterns of wage increases as observed from the data: First, the wage increases 
faster for men than women; second, the wage increases faster at low wages than high wages. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the explanations for race and gender wage differentials, widely observed in the labor 
market, is the presence of differences in endowments of characteristics related to productivity 
and preferences; the remaining unexplained gap could be either due to unobserved productivity 
differences or discrimination against the minority group.
1
 However, distinguishing these two 
effects is far from straightforward (Booth, 2009). To address this issue, Bowlus and Eckstein 
(2002) developed an equilibrium search model, which can separately identify discrimination 
from unobserved productivity differences because each of the two affects the earnings 
distribution differently. Using a sample of male high school graduates from the 1985-1988period, 
they find that blacks produced 3.3% less than whites, 56% of firms in the labor market had a 
prejudice against blacks, and the distaste was as high as 31% of the productivity of whites. 
Flabbi (2010), also studied gender wage inequality using maximum likelihood estimation in a 
search framework with matching and bargaining and concludes that female workers were 6.5% 
less productive than male workers and that half of employers discriminated against women in 
1995.  
This paper also belongs to this strand of literature. Based on a discrimination search 
model with wage-tenure contracts developed by Fang and Sakellariou (2013), we estimate 
productivity differences between blacks and whites, men and women and the existence of 
discrimination in the labor market during 1985-1988, using National Longitudinal Survey of 
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 Goldsmith et al. (1997) describe two mechanisms through which the psychological capital has impact on wages 
and Bowles et al. (2001) summarize the empirical evidence on the effect of personality and behavioural traits on 
earnings. However, in the wage decomposition literature, few researches have considered (or been able to control for) 
these factors in explaining the wage differentials. One example is Mueller and Plug (2006), who find that 
agreeableness, out of the five traits studied (extroversion, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience 
being the other four), has the greatest influence on earnings differences between men and women. 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The blacks are estimated to be 3% less productive than whites and 91% 
of firms possess distaste against blacks. In the context of gender, the productivity gap between 
male and female workers is estimated to be 3%, while 93% of firms had a strong distaste against 
female workers; this is about 95% of men’s productivity. Furthermore, by comparing the 
empirical hourly wage increase between genders/races with the predicted profiles, a certain 
correspondence between the two is observed, which to some extent supports the inference results 
and contributes to the literature on the tenure effect. 
2
 
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the discrimination 
search model with wage-tenure contracts developed in Fang and Sakellariou (2013) and presents 
the equilibrium solution and properties that will be used in this paper. Section 3 applies the 
model to the same set of data as used in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and compares the inference 
results from the two models. Within the gender wage inequality framework, section 4 estimates 
the extent to which gender productivity differences and discrimination contribute to the wage 
differentials; subsequently, the difference in wage-tenure profiles for men and women is 
compared with the empirical estimates. Section 5 concludes and points out the limitations of the 
model and the findings. 
2. Model 
In this section we outline the search discrimination model with wage-tenure contracts and 
summarize the results which are derived from the empirical exercises
3
. The model is closely 
related to Burdett and Coles (2003), who first established a random search model with wage-
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 Many studies have identified the positive effect of tenure on wages (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; 
Altionji and Williams, 2005), but the empirical evidence on gender/racial disparity in wage returns to tenure is 
competing. For example, Light and Ureta (1995) and Munasinghe et al. (2008) find that women receive lower wage 
return to tenure while Becker and Lindsay (1994) and Hersch and Reagan (1997) find the opposite.   
3
For model details and further insight see Fang and Sakellariou (2013). 
tenure contracts which is able to predict the wage increase due to not only job-to-job transition 
but also tenure effects. Fang and Sakellariou (2013) later extended this model to study 
discrimination and wage inequality. 
In the model setting, there are two types of workers and firms: majority workers (A) and 
minority workers (B); discriminating firms (D) and non-discriminating firms (N). Workers are 
differentiated by the appearance only and are of the same productivity (P). They are finitely 
lived, with a death/birthrateδ. The newly born enter the labor force immediately as unemployed, 
receiving unemployment insurance b per period. All workers both employed and unemployed 
keep searching for the job that maximizes their expected lifetime utility. Their optimal strategy is 
to quit and accept the new offer if and only if the expected lifetime utility exceeds the value from 
the current job.  A random search model is assumed here. 
Firms, on the other hand, post two wage-tenure contracts, one for 𝐴-workers and the 
other for 𝐵-workers, described by wA
J  t  and wB
J  t , where t denotes tenure and J denote the type 
of firms, to maximize profit. As opposed to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) where firms set a fixed 
wage, here wage increases for workers can be from not only job-to-job movements but tenure 
effects as well. Discrimination is presented in terms of offer arrival rates and distaste of 
discriminating firms. First, D-firms offer a job to A-workers at a rate of 𝜆 and to B-workers at a 
rate of (1 − 𝑘)𝜆;N-firms treat both types of workers the same and offer a job at a rate𝜆. Second, 
D-firms experience a disutility 𝑑 from hiring B-workers; that is, D-firms earn a profit of P −
wB
D t − d  per instant when hiring B -workers and a profit P − wA
D t  when hiring A -
workers.There are (1 − θ) worker- Atypes and θ worker- B types, 𝜎D-firms and (1 − 𝜎)N-firms. 
Workers’ utility function is u(w), with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0.Firms cannot fire workers or counter-
offer workers’ new offer.  
A baseline salary scale is used to describe the equilibrium solutions. That is, any wage-
tenure contract 𝑤(𝑡 𝑉0 )  , where 𝑉0 is the starting expected lifetime value, can be expressed using 
the baseline salary scale, starting from a specific point 𝑡0 : 𝑤(𝑡 𝑉0 ) = 𝑤𝑠(𝑡 + 𝑡0) . So the 
equilibrium is to find three salary ranges [𝑤𝐴 , 𝑤𝐴] , [𝑤𝐵
𝐷 , 𝑤𝐵
𝐷]  and [𝑤𝐵
𝑁 , 𝑤𝐵
𝑁]  and the 
corresponding wage-tenure dynamics that can support the salary movements.
4
Proposition 1 
below gives the equilibrium solutions: 
Proposition 1: At the steady state equilibrium, the baseline salary scale for worker 𝐴 satisfies: 
𝑃−𝑤𝐴
𝑃−𝑤𝐴
=  
𝛿
𝛿+𝜆
 
2
 (1)   
𝑢  𝑤𝐴 = 𝑢 𝑏 −
 𝑃−𝑤𝐴
2
 
𝑢 ′  𝑥 𝑑𝑥
 𝑃−𝑥
𝑤𝐴
𝑤𝐴
(2)   
The optimal wage-tenure contract for worker 𝐴 follows the dynamic path: 
𝑑𝑤𝐴
𝑑𝑡
=
𝛿(𝑃−𝑤𝐴 )
𝑢 ′ (𝑤𝐴 )
 
𝑢 ′  𝑥 𝑑𝑥
  𝑃−𝑤𝐴  (𝑃−𝑥)
𝑤𝐴
𝑤𝐴
   (3)   
For worker 𝐵, the baseline salary scale satisfies: 
𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑
 𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑
=  
𝛿+  1−𝜎 𝜆
𝛿+  1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆
 
2
 (4) 
𝑢  𝑤𝐵
𝐷 = 𝑢 𝑏 −
 𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑
2
 
𝑢 ′  𝑥 𝑑𝑥
 𝑃−𝑥−𝑑
𝑤𝐵
𝐷
𝑤𝐵
𝐷 (5) 
𝑤𝐵
𝑁 = 𝑤𝐵
𝐷                                       (6) 
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Fang and Sakellariou (2013) show that the upper bound cannot be reached, but an upper limit. 
𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝑁
𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝑁 = (
𝛿
𝛿+  1−𝜎 𝜆
)2          (7) 
And the dynamics of baseline salaries are:  
𝑑𝑤𝐵
𝐷
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝛿+  1−𝜎 𝜆)(𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑)
𝑢 ′ (𝑤𝐵
𝐷 )
 
𝑢 ′  𝑥 𝑑𝑥
  𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑 (𝑃−𝑥−𝑑)
𝑤𝐵
𝐷
𝑤𝐵
𝐷    (8) 
𝑑𝑤𝐵
𝑁
𝑑𝑡
=
𝛿(𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝑁 )
𝑢 ′ (𝑤𝐵
𝑁 )
 
𝑢 ′  𝑥 𝑑𝑥
 (𝑃−𝑤𝐵
𝑁 )(𝑃−𝑥)
𝑤𝐵
𝑁
𝑤𝐵
𝑁               (9) 
The conditions for the existence of the equilibrium, technical proof and detailed 
implication can be found in Fang and Sakellariou (2013).Only (1), (4), (6), and (7) are used in 
the identification steps. Wage dynamics (3), (8) and (9) are used to predict the wage-tenure 
effects, which can be used to test the estimates. Next, we highlight a few equilibrium properties 
that will be used in this paper. 
First, at equilibrium, the earnings distributions Kw
I  w , where I = A or B, are given by: 
Kw
A  w =
δ
λ
[ 
P−w A
P−w
− 1]                                          ( 1 0 ) 
Kw
B  w =
 
 
 
 
 δ
 1−σk λ
[ 
P−wB
D −d
P−w−d
− 1],                 if w ∈ [wB
D , wB
D ]
δ+ 1−σk λ
 1−σk λ
 P−wB
N
P−w
−
δ
 1−σk λ
,        if w ∈ [wB
N , wB
N ]
                 ( 1 1 ) 
From the earnings distribution, we can then calculate the mean and median of wages. 
Second, the unemployment rates of each type of workers are:  
uA =
δ
λ+δ
                                                 ( 1 2 )   
uB =
δ
δ+  1−σk λ
                                              ( 1 3 )   
and, the duration of unemployment is
5
: 
UDurA =
1
λ
 
UDurB =
1
(1 − 𝜎𝑘) 𝜆
 
3. Racial wage discrimination 
As abovementioned, one empirical difficulty in the discrimination literature is how to distinguish 
the unobserved productivity differences and discrimination in the residual wage gaps. Bowlus 
and Eckstein (2002) build a structural model that is able to identify both, due to the different 
impacts productivity differences and discrimination have on the earnings distribution. In this 
exercise, using the same data as Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and similar identification strategy, 
we estimate the structural parameters of the wage-tenure discrimination model, and compare 
how the inferences on the extent of productivity differences versus discrimination in explaining 
racial wage gaps differ between the two models.  
The data is from the NLSY79, covering the period from 1985 to 1988. The sample is 
restricted to “black and white males who graduated from high school between 1978 and 1984 
and have not pursued further education nor served in the military over our sample period” 
(Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). Table 1 is a summary of the data to be used in the estimation. 
Table 1 Summary of NLSY data for male high school graduates, 1985-1988 
 Whites Blacks Pooled 
Unemployment rate 7.7% 15.7% 8.9% 
Unemployment duration (weeks) 22.15 29.05 23.65 
Minimum weekly wage 118.18 120.39 118.18 
Maximum weekly wage 605.97 428.16 605.97 
Mean weekly wage 273.90 230.96 268.03 
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Proof and derivation can be found in Fang and Sakellariou (2013). 
3.1 Identification 
The model in the previous section assumes no differences between the two types of workers, 
except the observable characteristic which in this exercise refers to race. Now, to match the 
empirical observations in the data, we allow for racial differences in productivity 𝑃 and death 
rate𝛿. The wage and unemployment data is used for identification. The following illustrates the 
identification in the most general case where both productivity difference and discrimination 
exist. Identification of the structural parameters in other cases is then straightforward.  
First, using the unemployment duration, rate of unemployment and wage bound of whites 
𝜆, 𝛿𝐴 and 𝑃𝐴are identified as:UDurA =
1
𝜆
, 𝑢𝐴 =
𝛿𝐴
𝛿𝐴 + 𝜆
 and the equilibrium condition 
𝑃𝐴−𝑤𝐴
𝑃𝐴−𝑤𝐴
= 𝑢𝐴
2. 
Next, 𝜎𝑘  and 𝛿𝐵  are identifiable using blacks’ unemployment rate and duration of 
unemployment data as:UDurB =
1
(1−𝜎𝑘 ) 𝜆
and 𝑢𝐵 =
𝛿𝐵
𝛿𝐵 +(1−𝜎𝑘) 𝜆
. Note that hiring discrimination is 
key to matching the racial difference in unemployment duration and the varying death rate is 
crucial in determining the different unemployment rates. 
Third, parameters associated with discrimination, 𝑑, 𝜎, 𝑘 and 𝑤𝐵
𝐷 , and the productivity of 
black workers𝑃𝐵 are simultaneously identified from the system of equations: the estimated 𝜎𝑘, 
two equilibrium conditions 
𝑃𝐵−𝑤𝐵
𝐷−𝑑
𝑃𝐵−𝑤𝐵−𝑑
=  
𝛿𝐵+  1−𝜎 𝜆
𝛿𝐵 +  1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆
 
2
,
𝑃𝐵−𝑤𝐵
𝑃𝐵−𝑤𝐵
𝐷
= (
𝛿𝐵
𝛿𝐵+  1−𝜎 𝜆
)2, the mean wage 
𝐸𝑤𝐵 = 𝑤𝐵 +
𝛿𝐵
(1−𝜎𝑘 )𝜆
(𝑤𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵) −
2
1−𝜎𝑘
 
𝛿𝐵𝜎 1−𝑘 
𝛿𝐵+ 1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆
 𝑃𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵 − 𝑑 +
(1−𝜎)[𝛿𝐵+ 1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆]
𝛿𝐵
(𝑃𝐵 −
𝑤𝐵)   and the median wage:  
𝑤𝐵
.5 =  
𝑃𝐵 − 𝑑 −  𝑃𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵 − 𝑑  
𝛿𝐵
𝛿𝐵 + 1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆𝑞
 
2
            𝑖𝑓 
𝛿𝐵 (1−𝑘)𝜎
 1−𝜎𝑘 [𝛿𝐵+ 1−𝜎 𝜆]
> 0.5
𝑃𝐵 −  𝑃𝐵 − 𝑤𝐵  
𝛿𝐵+ 1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆
𝛿𝐵 + 1−𝜎𝑘 𝜆𝑞
 
2
                             𝑖𝑓 
𝛿𝐵 (1−𝑘)𝜎
 1−𝜎𝑘 [𝛿𝐵+ 1−𝜎 𝜆]
≤ 0.5
 .  
The estimation procedure is as follows: first, try the value of 𝑃𝐴 as the estimate of 𝑃𝐵 and 
derive all other parameters through the system of equations but the median one; then, predict the 
median wage according to the median wage equation; if it approximates the empirical median 
wage, keep all the parameter estimates, if not, modify the estimate of 𝑃𝐵  accordingly and re-
derive all the above until the predicted median wage tallies with the empirical one. One can also 
compare the predicted and empirical value at any other quantile to determine the appropriate 
estimates of parameters.    
3.2 Estimation 
We estimate the parameters in six versions from a simple case where there are no differences 
between whites and blacks, towards a complete model with both productivity difference and 
discrimination. In the simplest scenario where 𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 = 𝑃; 𝛿𝐴 = 𝛿𝐵 = 𝛿 and no discrimination 
present (𝑑 = 𝑘 = 0, 𝜎 = 1) , parameters 𝜆  and 𝛿  are solved from the pooled unemployment 
duration and rate of unemployment. Productivity level 𝑃 is then identified from the equilibrium 
condition 
𝑃−𝑤
𝑃−𝑤
=  
𝛿
𝛿+𝜆
 
2
 where 𝑤 and 𝑤 are replaced with 118.18 (minimum wage of the pooled 
population) and 605.97 (maximum wage of the pooled population) respectively. The 
assumptions and estimation results are presented in column (1) of Table 2. In scenarios (2) and 
(3), we calculate 𝛿𝑖  and 𝑃𝑖  using the separate unemployment rate and equilibrium condition by 
race instead. The productivity levels differ significantly between whites and blacks and 𝑃𝐵/
𝑃𝐴ratios are indeed smaller than the mean wage ratio as predicted in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). 
Varying 𝛿 is important in explaining the unemployment rate differential in the data.  
Table 2 Parameter Estimates 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 ; 
no 
discrimination; 
𝛿𝐴 = 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ; 
no 
discrimination; 
𝛿𝐴 = 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ;  
no 
discrimination; 
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present 
(𝑘 = 0); 
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present; 
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present; 
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝝀 0.0423 0.0423 0.0423 0.0423 0.0451 0.0451 
𝜹𝑨 0.0041 0.0041 0.0035 0.0035 0.0038 0.0038 
𝜹𝑩 0.0041 0.0041 0.0079 0.0079 0.0064 0.0064 
𝑷𝑨 609.86 609.86 608.88 608.88 608.88 608.88 
𝑷𝑩 609.86 430.62 435.94 537.21 591.02 608.88 
𝒅 0 0 0 441 429.67 436.34 
𝒌 0 0 0 0 0.2608 0.2580 
𝝈 1 1 1 0.8122 0.9106 0.9206 
𝒘𝑩
𝑫 - - - 99 158.65 169.41 
 
Scenario (4) begins to incorporate the assumption of discrimination by allowing for the 
disutility experienced by prejudiced firms from hiring black workers. 𝑃𝐵 , 𝑑, 𝜎  and 𝑤𝐵
𝐷  are 
calculated simultaneously using two equilibrium conditions and the equations of mean and 
median wages for black workers. The disutility level is found to be 72.4% of the white workers’ 
productivity, and 81.2% of the firms are prejudiced against black workers. When the restriction 
on equal hiring rate is relaxed in scenario (5), 91.1% of firms in the labor market have a distaste 
of 70.6% of the white productivity and offer to hire black workers at a rate 26.1% lower than the 
offer rate to whites.
6
 The productivity of black workers is only 3% lower than their white 
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These estimates are obtained to match the wage of black workers at the 10% percentile. When the median is 
matched in the estimation, the result implies black workers are more productive than whites and 96.5% of firms are 
counterparts. In this estimation, the model can not only match the racial differences in 
unemployment rates but unemployment durations as well. Finally, we get the parameter 
estimates in the scenario of pure discrimination in column (6).The last row of Table 2 presents 
the estimate of 𝑤𝐵
𝐷  when there is discrimination present in the labor market.  
The earnings distributions predicted in the pure productivity difference (scenario (3)), 
pure discrimination (scenario (6)) and mixed cases (scenario (5)) are shown in Figure 1, which 
clearly demonstrates the distinguishing effects productivity difference versus discrimination have 
on the earnings distribution. Furthermore, the wage-tenure discrimination model also allows for 
the depiction of wage dynamics. Figure 2 shows how the wage increase varies between blacks 
and whites at each wage level. In the case of pure productivity difference, the two lines have a 
similar shape and the blue line lies above the red one, suggesting a higher wage increasing rate 
for white workers compared to black workers at any wage level. In the case of pure 
discrimination, there is a striking gap between the blue line and the red line; moreover, the red 
line is discontinuous at the jump point. It indicates that discrimination is an influential factor in 
wage-tenure contracts, and the presence of discrimination leads to a sharp decrease in the wage 
increasing rate for blacks in both discriminating and non-discriminating firms. Intuitively, 
although non-discriminating firms do not discriminate against black workers, they have an 
incentive to offer a less attractive contract to black workers than otherwise, as there is now less 
competition among firms to hire black workers and black workers will be willing to stay and 
accept the less attractive contract because of no better options outside. When there are both 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
prejudiced with a distaste as high as 97.5% of the white productivity and an offer rate 24.6% lower to blacks 
(𝑃𝐵 = 812.41; 𝑑 = 593.59; 𝑘 = 0.2462; 𝜎 = 0.9649; 𝑤𝐵
𝐷 = 215.04 ). 
productivity differences and discrimination in the labor market, the line indicating the wage 
dynamics of black workers is a combination of the two effects.  
[Figure 1& Figure 2 about here] 
3.3 Comparison 
The estimation results imply that in the case of high school male graduates in 1985-1988, the 
productivity of black workers is 3% less than that of white workers and 91.1% of firms in the 
labor market have a distaste against black workers which is as high as 70.6% of whites’ 
productivity. Furthermore, these firms offer to hire blacks at a rate 26.1% lower than the offer 
rate they send to whites. Compared with the results in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), the same 
conclusion is drawn regarding the productivity differential between races. However, in this 
model, the fraction of discriminating firms in the labor market is higher, the disutility 
discriminating firms feel in hiring black workers is stronger, while the recruiting discrimination 
is not as severe as that predicted in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). It may be because there are so 
many firms having a strong prejudice towards black workers that it turns out to be costly to have 
such a distaste and profitable to relax the discrimination a little during recruitment.  
One should notice a few differences between these two models of Fang and Sakellariou 
(2013) (henceforth, FS) and Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) (henceforth, BE). First and foremost, a 
constant wage is assumed in BE while FS assumes wage changes with tenure. Therefore, except 
for using mean wages in estimation, we also utilize wage ranges. Second, productivity is 
different in interpretation. BE interpret 𝑃 as the average productivity level in a market with firm 
heterogeneity, while 𝑃 in FS model is the marginal productivity a worker brings to the firm 
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which does not vary across firms. It implies that 𝑃 must be greater than the maximum wage 
observed in the data. The estimated 𝑃 usingFSmodel is thus much greater than those in BE. 
Third, offer arrival rates are different among employed and unemployed workers in BE but they 
are the same in FS model; finally,𝛿 is the destruction rate in BE but birth/death rate in FS model.  
These simplifications of the FS model enable the estimation of different effects 
productivity differences and discrimination have on the wage gap and their respective wage 
dynamics. Figure 3 depicts how wage increases with tenure when there are both productivity 
differentials and discrimination in the labor market. The blue line represents the wage dynamics 
for white workers, the red line for black workers hired in discriminating firms and the yellow 
line for black workers hired in non-discriminating firms. Obviously, the slope of the blue line is 
greater than the slope of the yellow line, which is greater than that of the red line. It implies that 
white workers will experience a steeper wage increase with tenure, followed by the black 
workers in non-discriminating firms. Black workers employed in discriminating firms have to 
search for opportunities in non-discriminating firms after around 50 weeks otherwise the wage 
will stagger and remain almost unchanged. This supports the findings in Bratsberg and Terrell 
(1998) who conclude that the returns to actual experience are lower for blacks than for whites. 
Figure 3 Wage dynamics 
 
 
 
 
  
4.  Gender wage discrimination 
The second exercise is to estimate gender wage discrimination in the labor market andwhether 
the predicted pattern of wage dynamics matches the empirical one. 
4.1 Data 
The sample used is extracted from the NLSY79 for the period 1985-1987. To be included in the 
sample, an individual must be a white, either employed or unemployed in 1985, have graduated 
from high school and not enrolled in further education in the period 1985-1987. For the 
unemployed worker, we calculate the unemployment duration. There are two versions of 
unemployment duration. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈1 is the period that dates back from the week the worker became 
unemployed (no earlier than  year 1984) till the week he/she was either employed or out of labor 
force (no later than year 1987). 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈2 is the period that dates back from the week the 
unemployed worker became not employed (either unemployed or out of labor force, but no 
earlier than year 1984) till the week he/she was employed (no later than year 1987). Since 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈2 takes out-of-labor-force into the calculation of unemployment duration, it is greater than 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈1 which only counts the period of unemployment.7 For the employed worker, we keep 
workers who have been employed continuously during 1985-1986, and calculate the increase in 
                                                          
7
Bowlus (1997) built a three stage model (employment, unemployment and nonparticipation) to study the role of 
gender differences in behavior patterns on wage differentials. Our model, however, only allows for two stages, i.e., 
employment and unemployment. Therefore, when applying it to labor market differences on the basis of gender, 
“unemployment” refers to the status of unemployment or nonparticipation. 𝐷𝑢𝑟1(real unemployment duration) and 
𝐷𝑢𝑟2(nonemployment duration) generate two groups of estimates that help us to compare the implications.     
hourly wages. Table 3 summarizes the statistics that are useful in the estimation. Figure 4 plots 
the cdf and pdf distributions of hourly wage for both genders. 
  
Table 3 Summary of NLSY data for high school white graduates, 1985-1987 
 Male Female Pooled 
Unemployment rate 4.314% 5.257% 4.749% 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈1 (weeks) 29.237 19.668 24.237 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈2 (weeks) 34.661 36.771 35.664 
Wage range (hourly pay in cents) [41, 1923] [45, 1511] [41,1923] 
Average wage (hourly pay in cents) 823.3616 634.6458 743.4436 
Median wage (hourly pay in cents) 769 591 682 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Next, we explore the difference in patterns of wage increase between men and women. 
Figure 5 includes two scatter plots to show the rough relationship between wage increase and the 
1985 hourly wage(one is not weighted and the other weighted). It is found that points cluster in 
the lower middle part where the hourly wage is between $2.50 and $12.00 and the wage increase 
is below $5.00; and, substantially more “male” points lie at higher wages. The predicted lines 
describe the trends of wage increase over levels. To compare the wage profiles of men and 
women more clearly, Figure 6 plots the magnitude of average wage increase over twenty or forty 
wage categories for male and female workers. Numbers on X-axis represent the middle point of 
each wage category. It is observed that women’s wage increase is generally smaller than men’s 
wage increase, which is in consistent with the findings of Light and Ureta (1995) and 
Munasinghe et al. (2008). In addition, for both men and women, the magnitude of wage increase 
is much higher at low wages than at high wages. At very high wages (above $16.00), only male 
workers are observed. Since the identification strategy is the same as specified in the last 
exercise, the estimation results are presented directly. 
[Figure 5& Figure 6 about here] 
4.2 Estimation 
Table 4 reports the estimation results in three scenarios under two measures of unemployment 
duration. Assuming no discrimination present in the labor market, the productivity of women is 
estimated to be 21% lower than that of men.
8
 If discrimination is taken into account, the 
productivity gap shrinks to 3% of men’s productivity, smaller than the 6.5% reported in Flabbi 
(2010) who used a sample of white, college graduates from CPS 1995. Looking at the estimates 
of discrimination parameters, one can see that𝑘 is negative under 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈1, suggesting that a job 
offer goes to women more frequently. This is completely opposite to our expectation and 
problematic. As a matter of fact, compared to men, women are more often ending the status of 
unemployment by not participating in the labor market rather than finding a job. Therefore, it 
results in a seemingly lower unemployment duration among unemployed females compared 
unemployed males, when it is measured by 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈1. 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑈2, on the other hand, avoids this 
problem and is more appropriate in the situation of male-female discrimination. As indicated in 
column (5), when there is no productivity difference between men and women and all the gender 
wage gap is attributable to discrimination, about 94.3% of the firms are prejudiced against 
women, with a distaste as high as 94% of the productivity, and search for female workers is 6% 
less intensive than for male workers. If there are both productivity differential and discrimination, 
it is estimated that fewer firms (93.2%) have a slightly stronger distaste (96%) and stronger 
recruiting discrimination (6.1%) against women. The estimate of the fraction of discriminating 
firms is higher than the 52% found in Flabbi (2010) and 56% in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002). 
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Using a search model that does not allow for discrimination, Bowlus (1997) finds that the average gender 
productivity differences for college graduates is 17.1% and for high school graduates 25.3%. 
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1985 hourly wage
w
a
g
e
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
female
male
Table 4 Parameter estimates 
 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝑼𝟏 𝑫𝒖𝒓𝑼𝟐 
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ;  
no 
discrimination; 
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present;  
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present;  
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ;  
no 
discrimination;  
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 = 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present;  
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝑃𝐴 ≠ 𝑃𝐵 ; 
discrimination 
present;  
𝛿𝐴 ≠ 𝛿𝐵 
𝝀 0.0413 0.0342 0.0342 0.0280 0.0289 0.0289 
𝜹𝑨 0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
𝜹𝑩 0.0023 0.0028 0.0028 0.0016 0.0015 0.0015 
𝑷𝑨 1926.5 1926.50 1926.5 1926.5 1926.5 1926.5 
𝑷𝑩 1515.1 1926.50 1863.4 1515.1 1926.5 1863.4 
𝒅 0 1801.6 1851.2 0 1801.6 1851.2 
𝒌 0 -0.5342 -0.5445 0 0.0608 0.0615 
𝝈 1 0.9107 0.8935 1 0.9434 0.9324 
𝒘𝑩
𝑫 - 123.91 12.638 - 123.91 12.638 
 
How well does the FS model match the empirical wage dynamics? Using the estimates in 
column (6) of Table 4, we plot the theoretical pattern of wage increases for both men and women 
in Figure 7, which also shows a greater wage increase among male workers than female workers 
and a steeper increase in the lower wages as in Figure 5 and Figure 6, although the magnitude of 
wage increase differs. 
Figure 7 Predicted wage increase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper applies the discrimination search model with wage-tenure contracts developed by 
Fang and Sakellariou (2013) to NLSY79 data to study the race/gender wage inequalities with an 
aim to distinguish the unobserved productivity differences from discrimination in the labor 
market and also simulate the pattern of wage dynamics. For the sample period of 1985-1988, 
productivity difference between black and white workers is estimated to be 3% of white worker 
productivity; productivity differences between men and women are estimated to be 3% of male 
productivity. Ninety-one % of firms are prejudiced towards black workers and 93% towards 
female workers. The distaste they hold towards black workers is about 70% of white worker 
productivity and that towards women is 95% of male productivity. Compared to estimates in 
Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Flabbi (2010), we derive similar results on productivity 
differences, but much higher estimates on discrimination. In addition, our model predicts similar 
patterns of wage increases as observed from the data. First, the wage increases faster for men 
than women; second, the wage increases faster at low wages than high wages. 
However, there are some points noteworthy. Due to the model complexity and its own 
limitations such as the incorporation of tenure only rather than any other factors which also have 
an influence on the labor market outcome, the inference needs to be interpreted carefully. 
Although we have chosen race/gender groups with homogenous characteristics (i.e., education) 
with an aim to eliminate the effect of observed differences on earnings differentials and 
distinguish the extent to which discrimination and unobserved variables contribute to the residual 
gap, the estimate of productivity differences could not be interpreted exclusively as differences 
in unobserved attributes. It can be possibly explained by other controlling and observable factors. 
Third, one could construct an econometric model from Fang and Sakellariou (2013) to test the 
estimates.  
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Figure 1 Predicted earnings distributions 
(a) Pure productivity difference                                     (b) Pure discrimination                                   (c) Mixed: productivity difference and discrimination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Predicted wage dynamics 
(a) Pure productivity difference                                    (b) Pure discrimination                        (c) Mixed: productivity differences and discrimination 
 
 
 
 
 
0.2
.4
.6
.8
1
c
d
f 
o
f 
h
o
u
rl
y
 w
a
g
e
 a
t 
1
9
8
5
 (
w
e
ig
h
te
d
)
0 500 1000 1500 2000
pay85
male female
0
.0
0
0
5
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
5
.0
0
2
p
d
f 
o
f 
h
o
u
rl
y
 w
a
g
e
 a
t 
1
9
8
5
 (
w
e
ig
h
te
d
)
0 500 1000 1500 2000
pay85
male female
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
w
a
g
e
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
0 500 1000 1500 2000
1985 hourly wage
male male predicted
female female predicted
0
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
w
a
g
e
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
0 500 1000 1500 2000
1985 hourly wage
male male predicted
female female predicted
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
1
,0
0
0
w
a
g
e
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
25 125 225 325 425 525 625 725 825 925 1025 1125 1225 1325 1425 1525 1625 1725 1825 1925
female male
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
w
a
g
e
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
50 150 250 350 450 550 650 750 850 950 1050 1150 1250 1350 1450 1550 1650 1750 1850 1950
female male
Figure 4 Hourly wage distributions 
 (a) CDF of hourly pay                                                 (b) Kernel density of hourly pay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Scatter plots of wage increase and hourly pay 
  (a) Unweighted scatter plot                                                   (b) Weighted scatter plot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Hourly wage increase using 1986-1985 
(a) Over 40 categories                                                             (b) Over 20 categories 
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